From Kosovo to Conflict?
Just prior to the 50-year anniversary of NATO, the alliance embarked on the first real military intervention in its history in March 1999 by conducting a six-week bombing campaign of Serbian military units and the infrastructure in Kosovo and Serbia. The ultimately successful drive to halt the harassment and resulting deportation of ethnic Albanians in the province of Kosovo seemed to justify NATO's continued existence nearly a decade after the collapse of the Soviet system.
Germany's military contribution
Among the member nations contributing aircraft, personnel and air bases for the joint effort was Germany. NATO's intervention in Kosovo was a historic event for the German people, moving well beyond previous peacekeeping missions (German soldiers had come under fire once in 1993 during their United Nations assignment in Somalia). In Kosovo, German military units were involved in an armed conflict for the first time since World War II. With its all-weather deployment capability, Germany's squadron of Tornado aircraft proved itself on numerous missions over Kosovo and Serbia.
For Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and his foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, Germany's involvement in the military effort to coerce Serbia's Slobodan Milosovic to the negotiating table was quite a domestic political challenge. Germany's post-war constitution requires parliamentary approval for German armed forces to be used internationally. Pacifist elements in Schroeder's Social Democratic party and in Fischer's Green party threatened to veto the Bundeswehr's participation in the NATO intervention. Emphasizing his country's responsibility within the international community, Chancellor Schroeder got the needed majority support to allow his country's military contribution to the NATO effort
Even with European participation, the NATO strike force comprising hundreds of aircraft was quite a lopsided alliance in favor of America. At one point during the six-week air campaign, Gerhard Schroeder complained about America's lack of willingness to share its satellite intelligence with its NATO allies on the positioning of Serbian forces and the impact the bombing was having on them. Requests and complaints were of little use, however, as Schroeder himself admitted to his aides, since the United States was supplying more then 90 percent of the military hardware and personnel for the joint effort
As a consequence, France and Germany discussed developing a joint space-based intelligence gathering system, by no means an unrealistic goal given France's proven ability to put satellites into orbit from its launch facilities in French Guiana. Overall, however, a major side effect of NATO's military campaign against Serbia four years ago went largely unnoticed until April of this year: the determination that Europe needs to do more for its own military defense.
Proposal for a European defense force
In a historic meeting in Brussels on April 29, 2003, the leaders of Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg agreed to create a joint command structure, which they hope will become the cornerstone of a future "European Defense Union." At the conclusion of their talks, the four leaders declared their intent to create "the nucleus of a joint planning and command center for European Union military operations to be carried out without NATO assistance." In addition, their proposal envisions a "mutual defense clause similar to NATO" for this new "European security and defense union" (Reuters, April 29, 2003, emphasis added throughout).
In their statement, Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt, French President Jacques Chirac, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker were careful not to use the term "EU military headquarters." The proposed joint command center is scheduled to be operational by the summer of 2004 and will be located in the Brussels suburb of Tervuren. Belgian and Luxembourg military units are to be integrated into the existing French-German brigade, which will then be the initial unit of a future rapid deployment force. This new mobile strike force "will be available for engagements on NATO's behalf as well as for the European Union" (ibid.).
The four founding members of this new European defense effort also want the proposed European Union constitution amended to include a provision allowing those EU members who so desire to cooperate in joint military ventures. Even without this constitutional provision, however, the agreement reached at the 1998 EU summit in Amsterdam permits individual countries to proceed on the path to greater cooperation and integration when other EU members are unwilling or unable to do so. After the Brussels meeting, former French General Philippe Morillon, now a member of the European Parliament, even called for a "military euro zone," comparing a joint European defense agreement directly with the already existing "euro zone" and its common currency, the euro.
Interestingly, a survey conducted in all EU member countries on behalf of the European Commission showed 71 percent of EU citizens in favor of a common EU security and defense policy. The number responding positively to this question was even higher than for a common EU foreign policy, which 63 percent of those surveyed support (Hamburger Abendblatt, May 2, 2003).
No competition for NATO?
Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt, who invited his colleagues to Brussels for the April 29 meeting, sees the proposed joint military command as a much-needed opportunity to strengthen the European Union's foreign policy role.
In several interviews prior to the Brussels summit, Verhofstadt emphasized that the initiative was not directed against NATO. Instead, one could view it as a strengthening of NATO's European pillar: "We get nothing from a NATO with a single superpower and 18 smaller and larger dwarfs trying to keep up," Verhofstadt emphasized. "We need a NATO with a strong European pillar alongside the American one" (Deutsche Presse Agentur, April 28, 2003).
During a debate in Germany's Bundestag on April 3, 2003, Gerhard Schroeder also emphasized the need to strengthen Europe's joint defense and security arrangements. In an interview before Schroeder's speech in the Bundestag, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer had said that Europeans "may not make the United States responsible for Europe's weakness. Instead, Europe must strengthen the European pillar itself" (Bonner Generalanzeiger, April 4, 2003).
Others are concerned that the proposed joint defense structure will have a negative impact on the NATO alliance. Among them is Bavarian Governor Edmund Stoiber, who demanded the cancellation of the Brussels summit, which "could be viewed as a signal for the development of an expensive duplicate structure and an initiative directed against NATO" (Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, April 20, 2003).
In an interview with the Financial Times, British Prime Minister Tony Blair voiced similar concerns and rejected the idea of a "multipolar" world. "Some desire a so-called multipolar world having different centers of power, but I believe that these would soon develop into competing centers of power." In Blair's opinion, the world currently needs "only one center of power"—the United States of America (April 28, 2003). In comments following the Brussels meeting, Blair accused the four countries involved in the summit of having rejected his proposal for binding any European defense system to the NATO alliance.
America's Secretary of State Colin Powell called the summit agreement a "type of plan for developing some kind of headquarters," despite the careful wording chosen to describe the formation of the joint defense structure (Hamburger Abendblatt, May 2, 2003).
The wrong signal at the wrong time
Under other circumstances the Brussels meeting might have been interpreted as an effort to strengthen the European side of the NATO alliance. However, sharp disagreements within NATO in recent months prior to ousting Saddam Hussein by force had some observers questioning whether the alliance has a long-term future. The decision in Brussels to initiate a joint European defense structure is the wrong signal at the wrong time as far as the future of the NATO alliance is concerned.
The distance between the European Union and the United States will continue to grow. The American-led military action against Iraq revealed serious differences with major European allies and showed that the single remaining superpower is willing to discard its post-World War II approach of seeking the approval—or at least the quiet tolerance—of its European allies for its military intervention. Many Europeans now see America as unpredictable, as an "untethered Gulliver" (a term used by the German newsmagazine Der Spiegel) needing a counterbalance on the world scene.
Commentators in Germany openly call for a strong Europe as a counterweight to the United States, writing opinions that would have been unthinkable just 10 years ago. For example, the respected Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung described the current situation this way: "The growth of American power and the resulting growing asymmetry to Europe has reached the point not only for the German government where the formation of a strong European counterbalance is needed. Via integration Europe has mastered many of its own conflicts and should also bring peace beyond its borders and help fill the vacuum that would otherwise be left entirely to America" (April 4, 2003).
An editorial in the Donaukurier from the city of Ingolstadt used even stronger language: "Now that Russia has vacated its superpower status there are completely new opportunities for the EU. It would not only be foolish but even criminal for EU state and national leaders not to make use of them... It isn't good when a superpower can act as it pleases on the world scene. The world needs a counterweight to the U.S.A. With its traditions and experience, Europe is predestined for the role" (April 16, 2003).
While no major changes are expected next year, the impetus from the Brussels mini-summit shows what Europe must be prepared to do in the event the NATO alliance does collapse: provide for its own military defense.
The Brussels proposal had commentators using the term coined by German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer two years ago: a "core Europe" of European Union nations proceeding toward full political integration while other EU member states proceed at a slower pace—or do not participate at all.
What biblical prophecy reveals
As described in an earlier issue of World News and Prophecy, the "core Europe" concept possibly reflects the final stage of four successive world ruling empires predicted by the prophet Daniel in his interpretation of Babylonian King Nebuchadnezzar's dream, described in Daniel 2. Nebuchadnezzar, representing the Babylon empire, was the first of those four empires (Daniel 2:38). The fourth and final empire, pictured by the lower portion of the humanlike image King Nebuchadnezzar saw, is the Roman Empire. Its final appearance is represented by the toes of the image, and they are prophesied to be kings at the time Jesus Christ returns to the earth. He will end their reign by establishing the Kingdom of God (Daniel 2:34, 44-45).
The toes of the image are comprised of iron and clay, picturing a union that will feature strengths and weaknesses. In his interpretation of the dream, Daniel makes clear that this combination of iron and clay represents a mixture for the final appearance of the fourth kingdom, the Roman Empire. That mixture will not be cohesive (verse 43).
In the years ahead, the NATO alliance will undergo further serious internal challenges and be strained to the breaking point. Finally, a European, non-NATO military alliance will evolve into a replacement for NATO, likely comprising some, but not all, of the member states of the European Union.
For a fuller analysis of these prophecies write for our free booklets "Are We Living in the Time of the End?" and "The Book of Revelation Unveiled." —WNP